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4 Abbé Sieyès 
The immanent and transcendent nation 
Olga Bashkina 
Introduction 
Formally ratified in February 1831, the Belgian Constitution established parlia-
mentary monarchy with bicameral representation. The drafters of the Constitution 
sought to connect its legitimacy not to traditional or religious foundations but 
to society itself, which was expressed in the formulation of article 33 (originally 
article 25): “All powers emanate from the Nation. They are exercised in the man-
ner established by the Constitution”. The Constitution’s until recently uncon-
tested interpretation postulates that the meaning of sovereignty engrained in the 
Constitution by definition excludes all forms of direct democracy in favour of 
a representative government. This interpretation operates with a strict separa-
tion of the principles of direct democracy and representation that is expressed in 
two contrasting conceptions of sovereignty – popular and national sovereignty, 
respectively. 
It seems that the predominantly accepted national sovereignty paradigm pre-
vents democratic innovation and development in Belgium. It has been suggested 
that it is necessary to part with this dated conception of national sovereignty 
(Geenens and Sottiaux, 2015). One way to approach the issue of sovereignty in 
Belgium is to do it via conceptual analysis and the history of concepts. Which 
ideas influenced the meaning that is attributed to sovereignty in Belgium today? 
Several influences are usually named, but the two most common reference points 
for the origins of the national sovereignty paradigm are Abbé Sieyès, a politi-
cal theorist from the time of the French Revolution, and French constitutional 
scholar Raymond Carré de Malberg. 
Should the national sovereignty paradigm be abandoned in Belgium? To 
answer this question, I suggest looking at how one of the major influences of 
this conception – Abbé Sieyès – treated the issue of sovereignty. How did he 
understand the idea of national self-government through representation? Did he 
use the concept of sovereignty? Which conceptual problems did he encounter 
in theorising the idea of the free nation? Addressing these questions can shed 
new light on how to understand the idea of national sovereignty in Belgium. In 




through which to understand the free nation.1 Although he did not favour the 
concept of sovereignty as such, he developed influential insights that were later 
connected with the modern understanding of sovereignty. My interpretation 
suggests that Sieyès offered two major ideas that are both imprinted in the con-
cept of sovereignty today. Yet, in the evolution of Sieyès’ thought, these two 
ideas are conflicting and do not find a productive synthesis. Extrapolating the 
observations from the analysis of Sieyès’ theory onto the Belgian context, at the 
end of this chapter, I conclude that in order to promote democratic development 
in Belgium, one does not need to reject the concept of national sovereignty. 
Instead, a more productive approach is the combination of popular and national 
sovereignty in one system. 
Two conficting paradigms 
Perhaps the reference to Sieyès as the original theorist of national sovereignty is 
best traced to the work of the influential French constitutional scholar Raymond 
Carré de Malberg (1861–1935) (see Chapter 10). Carré de Malberg claimed that 
Sieyès “defined representative government, at the beginning of the new era of 
public law, with an accuracy and precision that has not been exceeded since then” 
(Carré de Malberg, 2003, II, p. 257). It is in Sieyès’ ideas on national represen-
tation, which he opposed to direct democracy, that Carré de Malberg saw the 
origins of the national sovereignty paradigm. In contrast to Carré de Malberg’s 
reading of Sieyès, today Sieyès is a prominent reference in radical democratic 
conceptions of popular sovereignty as constituent power (e.g. Kalyvas, 2005). 
According to this approach, Sieyès is part of a tradition of revolutionary demo-
cratic understanding of popular power coming from below. Which one is the real 
Sieyès then? 
Historically, Sieyès’ reception has been highly diverse. Sieyès significantly 
contributed to the continuous debate on new political forms during the revo-
lutionary decade. Moreover, the author of the infamous pamphlet Qu’est-ce que 
le tiers-état? influenced subsequent thinking about democracy and democratic 
founding for two centuries onwards. His legacy carried over into classical nine-
teenth-century French liberalism, the constitutional controversies of the twenti-
eth century, and twenty-first-century debates over democracy. Having lived till 
1836, Sieyès was a direct witness to all major events of the revolutionary years 
in France: the Tennis Court Oath in 1789, the execution of the king in 1793, 
the establishment of the Directory in year III, and the coup of 18 Brumaire (see 
Laquièze, 2008). Forgotten during some periods, Sieyès’ ideas have undergone 
several revivals, each of which has accentuated different aspects of his thought 
in light of the pressing debates of the time. In the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, debates that engaged with Sieyès included those over individual rights 
and the limitation of power (the Coppet Group: Madame de Staël and Benjamin 
1 I am assuming conceptual interconnectedness between ‘freedom’ and ‘sovereignty’. 
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Constant), national sovereignty (Adhémar Esmein, Léon Duguit, and Raymond 
Carré de Malberg), and constituent power (Carl Schmitt) (Laquièze, 2008). The 
scope of contemporary readings of Sieyès that are informed by the revived inter-
est in democratic founding and constituent power is remarkable. From revolu-
tionary thinker to theorist of constitutional limits, Sieyès exists in contemporary 
thinking in a variety of manifestations. 
Not only is this diversity of interpretations indicative of the richness of Sieyès’ 
thought, but it also gestures to a paradox at the heart of his theory of represen-
tation: While regarded as one of the first theorists of modern representation, 
some of his ideas appear to be anti-representational. Acclaiming the new revo-
lutionary potential of the French nation, he says that “if a nation had to wait 
for a positive mode of being in order to become a nation, it would simply never 
have had an existence” (Sieyès, 2003, p. 136). Statements like this contribute to 
a line of thought that suggests that representation does not create the nation, 
which already exists, but only the national government. Yet, in other passages of 
Qu’est-ce que le tiers-état?, he asserts that the nation is “a body of associates living 
under a common law, represented by the same legislature” and that “a nation is 
made one by virtue of a common system of law and a common representation” 
(ibid., pp. 97–99). This would seem to suggest that he believes that the nation 
cannot speak other than through its representatives. These different inflections 
within his thinking have, in turn, found their home in different interpretations. 
On the one hand, because of Sieyès’ extensive analysis of representation and the 
way in which he posits it at the centre of his politics, many assert that he follows 
the Hobbesian tradition in his argument about the nation (Forsyth, 1981; 1987; 
Hont, 1994). On the other hand, some fundamental claims made by Sieyès are 
ultimately anti-Hobbesian (Clavreul, 1982; Jaume, 1986; Laquièze, 2008). 
Consider, for example, the claim that “the nation exists prior to everything; it is 
the origin of everything. Its will is always legal. It is the law itself” or 
a nation is independent of all forms and, however it may will, it is enough 
for its will to be made known for all positive law to fall silent in its presence, 
because it is the source and supreme master of all positive law. 
(Sieyès, 2003, p. 138) 
These claims, together with a powerful statement equating the Third Estate with 
the entire nation, cast Sieyès’ theory of representation in a paradoxical light. They 
raise the question of whether Sieyès conceives of representation as the fundamen-
tal way of understanding political relations or whether the nation as a political 
agent can also be conceived and express itself in a pre-representational, direct 
way. The central problem is, in short, whether the nation is formed by the repre-
sentative will from above or is expressing itself directly from below. 
My interpretative approach departs from this more common debate on Sieyès’ 
idea of representation. While, within this debate, the problem pertains to how
the nation expresses itself (via representatives or directly), I am concerned with 
what is being expressed. While I too believe that the concept of representation is 
  58 Olga Bashkina
central for Sieyès, I choose to shift the focus of my enquiry away from the either/ 
or of representation versus the direct will of the people and frame my interpreta-
tion in terms of immanence and transcendence. My reading in the present chap-
ter offers a division of Sieyès’ ideas into these two paradigms. Representation 
remains important for both paradigms since, for Sieyès, the idea of representa-
tion is fundamental. That is to say, what changes in his thought is not how he 
conceives the national will being expressed – either directly or by means of rep-
resentation. Rather, what changes is what he thinks is being represented (and by 
whom) – immanent relations that already exist in a society or transcendent norms 
that should shape an ideal nation. In this chapter, I do not want to construct a 
system out of these paradigms. Rather, I want to think of them as two archetypes 
of thought that are both present in how we think about democracy today. 
One final remark is due about the concept of sovereignty itself. I read Sieyès 
with regard to the tradition of national sovereignty that is central to the Belgian 
case analysed in this book. However, it is necessary to note that Sieyès himself 
was critical of the concept of sovereignty and almost never used it in his own 
work (see Rubinelli, 2016). He associated the term ‘sovereignty’ with the tradi-
tion of absolutist rule that he was trying to debunk with his work. In his mind, 
‘sovereignty’ meant an absolute undivided highest power that was in conflict 
with the new liberal ideas of national representation that he proclaimed. Sieyès’ 
conceptions of representation and constituent power were directed against the 
personal power of the monarch. For Sieyès, ascribing sovereignty to any group 
of people would mean advocating for a form of tyranny. Later in the nineteenth 
century, ‘sovereignty’ came to also mean an attribute of an abstract rather than 
a concrete agent – a nation rather than a monarch. This is not yet the case for 
Sieyès. Yet, even if he is critical of a particular meaning of the term ‘sovereignty’, 
Sieyès remains a recurring reference in discussions of sovereignty. Ideas that he 
framed in different concepts, e.g. constituent power, have enriched the meaning 
of various conceptions of sovereignty and continue to do so today. 
Revolutionary immanence: Constituent power of the oppressed 
Born in 1748, Abbé Sieyès pursued a religious career until 1788, when Louis XVI 
called for the convocation of the Estates-General in Paris. After publishing his 
renowned pamphlet Qu’est-ce que le tiers-état?, Sieyès was elected a representa-
tive of the Third Estate to the Estates-General, which was soon to become the 
National Constituent Assembly. Sieyès’ pamphlet not only changed the course 
of debates at the time but also inspired the eventual revolutionary turn of events. 
Moreover, modern political categories continue to bear the mark of his innovative 
contribution (Guilhaumou, 2002). Yet, before developing his famous insights 
in Qu’est-ce que le tiers-état?, Sieyès had already experimented with big ideas 
in his pre-revolutionary studies in metaphysics and political economy. During 
his education at the Sorbonne, he was influenced by, among others, Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz, Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, Adam Smith, and the school 
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his pre-revolutionary writings – metaphysical (what Guilhaumou calls Sieyès’ 
“métaphysique du moi” [Guilhaumou, 1999, pp. 513–535]) and economic – that 
influence Sieyès’ thought in Qu’est-ce que le tiers-état?, especially the idea of con-
stituent power. It is these ideas that I frame as the immanent paradigm. 
Living force of society 
Guilhaumou (1997) has pointed to the particular influence of Leibniz’ monadol-
ogy and his principle of individuation on Sieyès’ Le cahier métaphysique (1773– 
1776). It is Leibniz’s philosophy of physics and his conception of vis via, or living 
force, that appears in Sieyès’ thought as force vive. Leibniz, in the famous con-
troversy with Sir Isaac Newton, rejected Newton’s first law of motion, according 
to which an object will obey the law of inertia, i.e. an object in motion stays in 
motion and an object at rest stays at rest unless it is acted upon by another force. 
In Newton’s mechanistic system, the understanding of motion is predicated upon 
a causal understanding of movement, i.e. movement is conceived as only caused 
by another force.2 In Specimen Dynamicum, Leibniz (1695/1989) develops a 
concept of vis viva, or living force, the earlier formulation of what we know now 
as the principle of the conservation of energy, according to which the energy of a 
system is not created or destroyed but is transformed within a system. Simply put, 
contrary to Newton, movement within a system does not presuppose an external 
cause; a system contains the constant principle of movement within itself. No 
outside transcendent source of motion and energy needs to be posited in order 
to account for the principle of movement of things – the cause of the movement 
is immanent in the moving thing. 
In Sieyès’ thought, this idea of living force reappears as force vive and is used in 
analysing the dynamics of a society. In Letters to the Economists, Sieyès writes that 
a society has an immanent force of its own: 
Society, independently of the power of nature which produces goods, must 
have a living force coproductive of wealth, and it is necessary that the ele-
ments of that force, united by society, produce more than they would if 
they remained isolated. The sum of the labors of all citizens forms the living 
force. If there is a citizen who refuses his portion of activity, he renounces 
his rights; no man may enjoy the labor of others without exchange. General 
labor is therefore the foundation of society, and the social order is nothing 
but the best possible order of labor. 
(Sieyès, 1985, p. 32) 
Sieyès’ theory of society rests on the analogy between a physical conception of 
living force and the economic theory of labour. Sieyès (2003, p. 95) argued 
2 In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke articulated it as “bodies operate by 





extensively against the economic theory of the physiocrats who claimed that eco-
nomic value is derived exclusively from agricultural labour. Instead, Sieyès con-
sidered that value derives from labour in general, which encompassed not only 
agricultural labour but also the labour of industrial and service workers as well 
as that labour used in social reproduction. This idea of general labour as a liv-
ing force resembles Marx’s later conception of living labour (lebendige Arbeit).3 
Similarly to Marx, living labour for Sieyès produces not only value but also social 
connections and sociability. In other words, this immanent force organises social 
relations before and prior to any external intervention. 
This account of immanent social force can also be found in Sieyès’ Qu’est-ce 
que le tiers-état?, where, in attempting to give a definition to the nation, he 
famously excludes the privileged classes from the definition of the nation for 
“a class like that is surely foreign to a nation because of its idleness” (ibid., p. 
97). Sieyès’ pamphlet is revolutionary because it exposes how there is a conflict 
between existing social relations and the political system of the Ancien Régime. 
This idea allowed Sieyès to formulate the revolutionary definition of the Third 
Estate as an entity that becomes a political subject because it performs “the activi-
ties that support society” (ibid., p. 95) but lacks political rights. For Sieyès, the 
Third Estate constitutes the living force of the social body because it performs the 
labour required for its subsistence, but the dominant system of social organisation 
does not recognise the Third Estate as equal and oppresses it. Sieyès argumenta-
tion in this pamphlet is operating within what I call the ‘immanent paradigm’ as 
it is built on highlighting the conflict between the existing immanent dynamic of 
relations in a society and a system of domination that ignores this built-in vitality. 
Constituent power 
Within this immanent paradigm, the emerging political subject can be conceived 
on the basis of existent social relations that are not reflected in the current politi-
cal system. In the pamphlets of 1788 and 1789, the theme of the contradiction 
between social reality and political inequality is apparent. This is expressed in 
Sieyès’ view that constituting a new people (un peuple neuf) requires first getting 
rid of all the privileges separating people. He explores this point in his piece Essai 
sur les privilèges, printed in 1788 and reprinted in 1789: 
It is the essence, the characteristic, of privilege to place the possessor of it 
beyond the boundaries of common right. […] [People] seem ignorant that 
their property, thus increased, with all the additions which a new spirit of 
3 “Labor not as an object, but as activity; not as itself value, but as the living source of value” 
(Marx, 1857/1993, p. 296); “Capital is dead labor, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking 
living labor, and lives the more, the more labor it sucks. The time during which the laborer 
works, is the time during which the capitalist consumes the labor-power he has purchased of 
him” (Marx, 1867/1981, p. 342). 
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industry has been able to accumulate in a social state, is in reality their own, 
and could never be considered as the gift of an extrinsic power. […] The 
grant of any exclusive privilege to any person with respect to that which 
belongs to all would be to wrong the whole community for the sake of an 
individual; which is an idea at once the most unjust and the most absurd. 
(Ibid., pp. 70–71) 
This point shows that privileges exist above the law (common or positive) because 
they operate as if no law can regulate them. While privileges can be instituted in 
the law itself, e.g. by legally establishing the division of society into social orders, 
privileges can also function tacitly as “the deplorable effect of long servitude on 
the human mind” (ibid., p. 70). 
Having noted that the Third Estate constitutes the entire nation based on the 
living force of labour and that the unjust system of existing privileges oppresses 
the Third Estate, Sieyès can introduce his famous idea of pouvoir constituant: 
The nation exists prior to everything; it is the origin of everything. Its will 
is always legal. It is the law itself. […] The first in order of precedence will 
be the constitutional laws. These laws are said to be fundamental, not in the 
sense that they can be independent of the national will, but because bodies 
that can exist and can act only by way of these laws cannot touch them. In 
each of its parts a constitution is not the work of a constituted power but a 
constituent power. 
(Ibid., p. 136) 
Even though Sieyès does not spend much time defining the concept of constitu-
ent power, the concept has become influential in democratic and constitutional 
theory. While there is much debate around the meaning of the concept, ‘constit-
uent power’ generally expresses the intuition that the people themselves should 
be the authors of the basic rules by which they are governed. Sieyès clearly makes 
this argument when he asserts that the unprivileged Third Estate can speak for 
the entire nation as the unjust laws imposed from above have been oppressing 
them for too long. In other words, in Sieyès’ immanent paradigm, the exercise 
of constituent power by extraordinary representatives frames and expresses the 
grievances of an oppressed group and aims to change the dominant social and 
political order. Having made this argument for what I call revolutionary imma-
nence, Sieyès confronts the question of how to combine in thought and in prac-
tice the assertion of the revolutionary potential of the people and the organisation 
of the new political system. 
Antonio Negri, the well-known Marxist theorist of constituent power, 
acknowledges Sieyès for being the first to introduce labour as an exclusive theme 
in the discussion of constituent power (Negri, 2009, p. 212). For Negri, Sieyès’ 
economic definition of society shapes the content of his other concepts, e.g. 
constituent power and representation. According to Negri, Sieyès represents 
society as “a laborious, unified and compact whole, standing on the social work 
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organized by the bourgeoisie, and whose development is obstructed by the con-
tradiction between labor and public functions, on the whole usurped by the aris-
tocracy” (ibid.). Yet, Negri is critical of Sieyès for he believes that Sieyès’ concept 
of labour and hence his conception of constituent power is inherently conserva-
tive. For Negri himself, constituent power is a concept that reflects class strug-
gle and, thus, the transformation of social relations. For Sieyès, a new political 
order should conserve already existing labour relations rather than change them. 
Hence, Negri concludes, Sieyès’ representative notion of constituent power pre-
vents and suppresses actual revolutionary socio-economic change (ibid., p. 214). 
Yet, Sieyès’ immanent paradigm does justify revolutionary transformative 
action insofar as it allows for the transformation of the old oppressive system into 
a regime animated by a new conception of the people. The difference between 
Negri’s and Sieyès’ understandings of transformation lies in the fact that Sieyès 
does not advocate for direct action. Like Negri, Sieyès sees the foundation of 
transformative action as existing immanently in society; unlike Negri, he under-
stands this action as representative in nature: 
Citizens who appoint representatives renounce and must renounce making 
laws themselves; they do not have a particular will to impose. If they dictated 
their wills, France would not be a representative state anymore, it would be a 
democratic state. The people, I repeat it, in a country that is not a democracy 
(and France cannot be a democracy), the people cannot speak, cannot act 
other than through their representatives. 
(Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, pp. 
594–595) 
Nadia Urbinati has framed Sieyès as a theorist of the nation of electors; unlike 
Girondists such as Marquis de Condorcet, he did not conceive of elements neces-
sary for a participatory democracy (Urbinati, 2006). It was Sieyès’ anti-federalist 
position and praise of representation that made Carré de Malberg frame him as 
the first theorist of national sovereignty. While Sieyès does advocate for repre-
sentation over direct action, his deeper concern is the exact nature of this repre-
sentation: what should be represented and by whom? Once he uncovers the idea 
of the revolutionary principle immanent in society, he starts questioning who 
can embody and exercise this principle to transform society. It is in respect to 
this questioning that one can single out a transition period in Sieyès’ thought in 
which he shifts from the immanent to the transcendent paradigm. 
Transcendent nation: The project of a constitutional jury 
Transition 
The idea that Sieyès did not exclusively reject all forms of direct participation has 
been put forward by Olivier Beaud and Andrew Arato, who emphasise Sieyès’ dis-
cussion of the preliminary constitution. Beaud posits that Sieyès’ idea of constitu-
ent power is twofold: it consists of destructive (déconstituant) and constructive 
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(constituant) moments (Beaud, 1994). The first moment consists of completely 
unbound negative will, while the second moment relies on democratically estab-
lished procedures and rules. This distinction is important in order to see the con-
nection between the allegedly radical and representative dimensions of Sieyès’ 
constituent power. While radical constituent power pertains to negating privi-
leges and oppressive relations, constructive constituent power establishes rules as 
to how to, among other things, change established rules democratically. Arato 
underlines how the originality of this idea lies in Sieyès emphasis on how demo-
cratic constituent power can be conceptualised between revolution and reform 
(Arato, 2017). In Préliminaire de la Constitution françoise (1789a), Sieyès talks 
about the process of drafting the first Constitution: 
The constitution which will be given to France, and which the necessity of 
circumstances must make provisionally obligatory for all, will be definitive, 
only after new deputies, regularly delegated to exercise solely constituent 
power, have it revised, reformed if necessary, and will have given it a national 
consent which the rigor of the principles demands. 
(Sieyès, 1789a, pp. 17–18) 
Clearly, for Sieyès, a free people comes into being over time and through a pro-
cess rather than in a single moment of original creation. He proposes several 
stages of constitution drafting and maintains that it is important to involve citi-
zens in the process. Arato and Beaud, who identify the importance of this idea 
for Sieyès’ thought, focus only on the drafting of the actual document of the 
constitution and the possibilities of increasing participation in it. Yet, this idea 
of constitution as a process has larger implications for Sieyès. In the foreword to 
the same publication, Sieyès inquires about what it means to give a constitution 
to a new people (un peuple neuf) (ibid., p. 16). For the principles proclaimed in 
the Declaration of Rights and in the Constitution to function, a society needs to 
be ready and aware of those principles. But those people whom these documents 
declare to possess civil and political rights have been subjected to “centuries of 
misfortune” (ibid.). That is why, Sieyès diagnoses, ideas like constituent power 
emanating from the nation, the abolition of privileges, equality, etc., first assert 
themselves as “transcendental metaphysics” (ibid., p. 6). When he states that 
society needs to mature in order to realise those ideas “not as a set of laws, but as 
a set of principles” (ibid., p. 3), Sieyès is implying that fundamental laws should 
not only be enforced upon the people but also be internalised and consciously 
accepted as their own laws. 
In this regard, the idea of a preliminary constitution takes up a broader signifi-
cance in Sieyès’ thought. A constitution conceived in this way envisions the emer-
gence of a free people over time, and it would rely on a system of representative 
institutions that serve a unifying and an enlightening function but do not replace 
the active citizenry. Sieyès adheres to the idea of progress as the approximation 
to the ideal of complete collective freedom. A new people comes about in the 





drafting of the constitutional document. In a different text from the same year 
(Quelques idées de Constitution, applicables à la ville de Paris), Sieyès advances 
that the category of active citizens, which he initially distinguished from passive 
citizens, will expand with time.4 With the help of national education and the for-
mation of new interests, people will be able to see past their individual concerns 
and acquire a shared concern for social issues (Sieyès, 1789b, p. 21). Thus, for 
Sieyès, constitutional principles should eventually become reflected in social real-
ity. The idea of a preliminary constitution then speaks both to the possibility of 
redrafting the fundamental law of the community and to the eventual actualisa-
tion of the ideals of equality and liberty in practice. As to what such a constitution 
might look like – what combination of citizen participation and representative 
institutions it would involve – Sieyès does not give a clear answer. Nonetheless, 
he furnishes political theory with an original and lasting picture of constituent 
power that does not sever its representative and radical dimensions. For Sieyès, 
the changes propelled by the Revolution do not stop but evolve and influence 
society over time. This, in turn, means that institutions are not static but should 
be able to change as ideas do. 
The project of a constitutional jury 
The Sieyès of Qu’est-ce que le tiers-état?, a mouthpiece of the Revolution, theo-
rised constituent power as the power of a nation to create for itself whatever laws 
it pleases. In the early years of debates around constitutional proposals, Sieyès 
developed the position that since the nation establishes its freedom over time, 
recurring constitutional amendments are required. Finally, after the end of the 
Reign of Terror, in the years of the Thermidorian Reaction (1794–1795), Sieyès 
was preoccupied with problems arising in a very different political context, and 
in his thought, the radical democratic potential of constituent power is replaced 
by the need to prevent the creativity of constituent power. In speeches made 
during these years, Sieyès explores how the stability of a constitutional order 
can be preserved. During Thermidor, Sieyès seeks to put an end to revolution-
ary experimentation and secure its results: equality, citizen rights, and liberties. 
If the Revolution itself cannot sustain what it has fought for, what can? Having 
proclaimed the equality and liberty of citizens, the Revolution resulted in the 
despotic reign of the few. With this in mind, Sieyès was preoccupied not with 
the task of democratic founding qua inventing new possibilities but with preserv-
ing what had already been established. For the purpose of demonstrating how a 
constitutional order can preserve citizen rights, Sieyès comes up with the project 
of a constitutional jury. This project is believed to be the first analogue of the 
contemporary constitutional court. 
Seeking to protect the Constitution and secure its basic principles, Sieyès ima-
gines a power that would exist above and be independent of the political process.
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This neutral power would watch over the legislative process and, if necessary, regu-
late it to keep it aligned with the principles of citizen rights and equality. This
project of a constitutional jury is connected with an earlier debate that Sieyès had
with the drafters of the Constitution of 1791 (Jacques Guillaume Thouret and
Antoine Barnave) over the question of the royal veto (Pasquino, 1998, pp. 11–13).
Sieyès did not support the right of a monarch to veto laws drafted by the National
Assembly, arguing that the king is not an elected representative of the nation and
thus cannot intervene in the legislative process. In 1795, Sieyès theorises an alter-
native power to serve this neutral function. A constitutional jury, un dépositaire
conservateur de l’acte constitutionnel, judges on the constitutionality of proposed
laws and drafts cahier de propositions once every decade as a way of improving the
Constitution (ibid., p. 195). He envisions three functions to be exercised by the
jury: 
1) that it faithfully watches over the safeguard of the constitutional ‘deposit’; 
2) that, sheltered from the pernicious passions, it takes into consideration all 
proposals that may serve to ameliorate the Constitution; 3) that, ultimately, 
it offers to civil liberties the possibility to appeal to natural equity on those 
serious occasions when the guardianship of the law will have forgotten its 
fair guarantees. 
(Goldoni, 2012, p. 6) 
While I will not discuss all the organisational details and implications of such
a constitutional jury, it is important to emphasise how this idea is aligned with
Sieyès’ conception of representation. As Marco Goldoni explains, the concep-
tion of representation that underlies Sieyès’ idea of the jury is based on the
idea of cooperation, rather than conflict. Sieyès thought of public powers as
forming a unity of will and not a balance of powers representing different social
interests. In this sense, the jury was to fulfil the function of an apolitical elite
which guarantees that no political conflict gets in the way of national unity. A
constitutional jury institutionalises democratic founding and “is presented as
the building block of a system that keeps citizens’ active participation to a vital
minimum” (i.e. away from constitutional matters and only voting for ordinary
representatives) (ibid., p. 22). 
Moreover, this conception of the constitutional jury as taming social and polit-
ical conflicts is paired with a conception of the nation that transcends the present 
generation and represents ‘human nature’. Bronislaw Baczko has emphasised that 
Sieyès changes his take on the nation from 1789 to Year III from a concrete 
association of 25 million men to an abstract entity extending over successive 
generations (Baczko, 1988, pp. 98–125). In the speech where he presents his 
project of the constitutional jury, Sieyès discusses whether it is advisable to permit 
a constitutional reform. He defends the belief that amelioration instead of total 
renovation is best. It is at this point that he suggests that the idea of the nation 
expresses human nature rather than any particular temporal identity: 
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Without wishing to dispute with future generations the right to do anything 
in this respect that suits them, it is permissible, and it is still a duty to remark 
that the true relations of a political constitution are with the nation that 
remains, rather than with such passing generation; with the needs of human 
nature, common to all rather than individual differences. 
(Bastid, 1939, p. 35) 
What is this nation that remains? Marcel Gauchet theorises this as the two bod-
ies of the people: the actual people and trans-temporal or constituent people 
(Gauchet, 1995, p. 42). The appearance of the transgenerational nation and the 
constitutional jury in the same text is not accidental. Sieyès here conceptual-
ises positive achievements of the Revolution and speculates how the values of 
citizen rights and liberties can be practiced. Once identified, rights expressed in 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen need to be safeguarded 
and perfected by the knowledge and experience of the centuries (‘les lumières et 
l’expérience des siècles’). If these rights pertain to human nature itself, then their 
bearer can be conceived as an atemporal subject that transcends conflicts and 
differences. 
Thus, over the course of the Revolution, Sieyès substantially changed his 
views on the principle that constitutes a free people. In the initial stages of the 
Revolution, characterised by the conflict between the immanent organisation of 
social relations and the status quo political system, he attributed revolutionary 
potential to the Third Estate. For it was the Third Estate that manifested itself as 
the critical subject in the act of the negation of the old social, political, and legal 
order. Thus, in Sieyès’ earlier texts, a free people is constituted by the principle of 
radical conflict. In contrast, the conception of the nation that operates in Sieyès’ 
later texts is predicated upon the assumed universality of human nature (as shared 
by the citizens of the nation-state and, most importantly, as interpreted by the 
jury). It posits that basic rights and liberties need to be protected from political 
conflict; the idea being that the people’s freedom is ensured when constitutional 
change is restricted to a special constitutional organ. 
This later position of Sieyès prefigures what today is framed as legal constitu-
tionalism. According to legal constitutionalism, the proclamation and protection 
of individual rights and constitutional limits to power are definitive hallmarks of 
democracy. Constitutions are considered primarily to be legal documents that 
enshrine fundamental rights. The protection and interpretation of these funda-
mental rights are assigned to a counter-majoritarian institution, often a supreme 
or constitutional court (Bellamy, 2007). The argument for judicial review is 
usually motivated by counter-majoritarian reasons: majorities can pass oppres-
sive legislation and turn into tyrannies. Additionally, there is an assumption that 
the law-making process needs to rely on the pre-established definition of rights 
to obtain guiding values. Rights themselves in this model are understood in a 
legal and not a political way and allow for little democratic contestation over 
their content and applicability. The role of interpreting the Constitution and the 
rights is assigned to judges who are thought of as standing above the political 
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process. In this framework, constituent power is an elusive concept; it never fully 
emerges to challenge the constituted order and oftentimes “the question of con-
stituent power simply does not arise” (Dyzenhaus, 2007, pp. 129–130). Pasquale 
Pasquino frames Sieyès’ theory as the foundation of this framework. He praises 
Sieyès as the father of modern constitutionalism who explicated major concepts 
essential for modern democracies (Pasquino, 1998). Sieyès’ influence is most 
noticeable, for Pasquino, in how his theory of the constitutional jury later became 
central for many constitutional regimes. Developed later in Sieyès’ career, this 
theory frames the constitutional jury not only as the guarantor of the rights of 
human nature but also as the body that will defend them from the perils of poli-
tics (Pasquino, 2007).5 
Conclusion 
The shifts in Sieyès’ thought are natural difficulties that arise when we theorise 
how democratic society and politics can exist. The two paradigms that I sin-
gle out in Sieyès’ thinking express equally important ideas for the democratic 
tradition. On the one hand, modern democracy, marked by the experience of 
the American and the French revolutions, contains elements critical towards the 
status quo. The interpretation of democracy that is attuned to this critical and 
oppositional dimension is, so to speak, an immanent one, that is, it understands 
5 Following this reading, Pasquino insists that there is no other way to understand constitu-
ent power in Sieyès’ work except as the power to authorise (so not the power to author the 
constitution). In this reading, the constituent power that is exercised by representatives does 
not presuppose that the people are actual authors of the constitution. The only way that 
constituent power can be understood in Sieyès’ theory, Pasquino claims, is in the same way as 
the contemporary meaning of the constitution is, i.e. “a text establishing fundamental rights, 
their guarantee, and the basic rules for governing a given country” (Pasquino, 2016, p. 230). 
Authorisation can either mean electing a representative assembly (ex ante) or popular ratifi-
cation (ex post). Sieyès did not theorise popular ratification, but authorisation in his theory 
should be understood as the election of extraordinary representatives. Pasquino uses Sieyès 
to justify the indispensable role of constitutional courts in contemporary democracies. He 
also combines it with the ‘thin’ conception of popular ratification (ex ante). In The Sleeping 
Sovereign, Tuck attempted to disassociate Sieyès with the paradigm of popular ratification. 
The point of Tuck’s book is to demonstrate that there is an intellectual tradition of modern 
democracy that is based on the distinction of sovereignty and government. This tradition for 
Tuck runs as a motif through the works of Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rous-
seau, and the thought of the American Revolution. It pertains to the plebiscitary model of 
popular sovereignty and should be considered, according to Tuck, the normative model for 
modern democracy. The distinction of sovereignty and government, expressed by Hobbes but 
fully developed by Rousseau, refers to the separation of the act of foundation and regular gov-
ernment. While government cannot but be representative, sovereignty manifested in the act of 
founding should always be direct. Tuck explains that direct democratic sovereignty does not 
author the constitution but authorises it. This means that the people in an ideal democracy, 
for Tuck, do not participate in drafting the constitution, but authorise its enforcement. Since 
Sieyès did not assign value to referendums, he, for Tuck, falls out of this tradition of modern 









democracy through the people themselves and their immanent struggles for lib-
eration from oppression. Sieyès was an astute observer of this dynamic: through 
the perspective of labour relations, he saw how the struggle of the Third Estate to 
become a free people contradicted the existing political system. In contemporary 
experience, the idea of the people’s struggle against oppression is expressed in 
a variety of critical narratives and social movements – for gender equality, anti-
racism, LGBTQ+, etc. On the other hand, there is an idea of the unifying norm 
of what should constitute a free people. Ideas like ‘nation’, ‘equality’, or ‘sover-
eignty’ are also guiding ideas which, when being interpreted, give norms as to 
how a democratic society should be organised. The risk, though, of emphasising 
these guiding ideas too much is that of delegating their interpretation exclusively 
to a small group, like Sieyès did with his project of the constitutional jury, which 
adopts the role of an oracle of the transcendent nation, instead of speaking to and 
with the people with which it was contemporary. 
A reader of Sieyès, Carré de Malberg (see Chapter 10), whose ideas on national 
sovereignty primarily influenced Belgian discourse, thought of the nation in that 
transcendent way. He thought, like the late Sieyès, that sovereignty is an attribute 
of an abstract entity rather than of concrete people with their current grievances 
and needs. The French Constitution of the Fifth Republic allegedly solved the 
conflict between the popular and national sovereignty model with the follow-
ing formulation: “national sovereignty belongs to the people who exercises it 
through its representatives and through referendums. No section of the people 
and no individual may purport to exercise it” (Ziller, 2003, p. 267). In con-
trast, in Belgium today, the debate on the question of popular versus national 
sovereignty is very much a live one, which is centred on the opposition of direct 
and representative mechanisms for expressing the national will. In other words, 
it is centred on how the national will is expressed. In my discussion of Sieyès 
thought in terms of immanent and transcendent paradigms, I pointed out that it 
is not only how the national will is expressed that matters but also what is being 
expressed. Sieyès was never an advocate of direct democracy, always insisting that 
representation is a modern way of organising politics. However, he pursued two 
different intuitions as to what (and by which representatives) is being represented 
as the national will. The early Sieyès highlighted immanent relations within a 
society that legitimise and inform the act of extraordinary representation and the 
creation of a new political order that corresponds to these relations. The later 
Sieyès shifted to the idea of a transcendent nation – its principles need to be dis-
covered and protected by a constitutional jury. 
We can think of popular and national sovereignty not only in terms of mech-
anisms of will expression but also in terms of these immanent and transcend-
ent dimensions. This offers new perspectives on intractable and long-standing
political problems. When we talk about Belgium, should we abandon the criti-
cised national sovereignty model? It seems to me that it still holds valuable ideas
within itself, i.e. ideas of a society united on the basis of liberal principles, con-
stitutional guarantees, and the separation of powers instead of ethnic ties. Yet,
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takes the form of critical opposition towards the dominant regime. If the gap
between the immanent and the transcendent elements of the people grows too
large, the system collapses. This suggests that a combination of the immanent
and the transcendent is necessary, especially in cases where more direct partici-
pation (i.e. more popular sovereignty) can be a way to conceive of institutional-
ising the immanent element of the people. Although sketching an institutional
model suitable for Belgium is beyond the scope of this chapter, Sieyès’ com-
plex negotiation of democracy and representation does suggest ways of moving
beyond a dichotomised understanding of popular and national sovereignty. 
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